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New York's 
1199 in 1989 
Rebuilding a Troubled Union 
• Gerald Hudson & Barbara Caress 
Early fall, 1986. The newly elected executive officers of Local 
1199 of the Drug, Hospital & Health Care Employees Union in 
New York City are negotiating a contract with officials of the 
League of Voluntary Hospitals. The deal offered is not very good. 
In caucus, union negotiators examine their options: accept the deal 
and be done with it, or rely on informational picketing planned 
for the next morning to strengthen their hand. Fearful of a poor 
turnout, they accept the League's offer. 
Early fall, 1989. The newly elected executive officers of Local 
1199 are again negotiating with the League of Voluntary Hospitals. 
Up against a strike deadline, the League throws in the towel. 
How did this remarkable turnabout happen? 
1199's contract campaign of 1989 resulted in more than a con-
tract victory for 50,000 hospital and nursing home workers. It 
marked the moment when 1199 reconstituted itself. The method 
and form that reconstitution took had everything to with the 
peculiar history of the union and a fundamentally destabilizing 
leadership crisis, with the racial and ethnic diversity of the people 
• Gerald Hudson is Executive Vice President of 1199, the Drug, Hospital & Health 
Care Employees Union in New York City. Hudson also is a Consulting Editor 
to Labor Research Review. Barbara Caress is a health policy consultant to the 
union. 
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in the union and the different kinds of work they do, and with 
the industry they work in. Ironically, some of the techniques used 
to achieve the victory, developed to compensate for structural 
weaknesses, reinforced those weaknesses. The union's continu-
ing problem is to find ways of integrating its successes with its 
ordinary life. 
Recent History of 1199 
1199 is a 100,000-member local union of hospital, nursing home, 
home care, mental health and drug store workers. It has been 
through an extraordinary decade. 
From 1959 into the mid-1970s, 1199 organized workers at most 
of the private, nonprofit, voluntary hospitals in the New York City 
area. By the end of the 1970s, it had expanded far beyond the local 
area and had organized 80,000 health care workers from New 
Jersey to California. It was one of the fastest growing and most 
progressive unions in the country. 
Then 1199 hit the '80s. Most destructive was a severe secession 
crisis that splintered the leadership and left the membership 
spread out in three separate international unions (RWDSU, SEIU, 
AFSCME). The founding local in New York, led by President Doris 
TUrner, was paralyzed and nearly destroyed by a disastrous 47-day 
strike. 
In 1986, the Turner leadership was challenged by a determined 
insurgency led by disaffected rank-and-file members and former 
union staff. The insurgents' main support was among professional 
and technical workers—social workers, lab techs, dieticians, and 
therapists who were the union's Guild Division. They also had 
significant support among the Latino members. The bulk of 
Turner's forces were hospital and home care workers—black, 
relatively low paid and female—who were the union's Hospital 
Division. After intervention from the U.S. Department of Labor, 
the insurgents won a union-wide election. 
The new leadership's first challenge was to negotiate a contract 
for the 50,000 workers in the hospitals and nursing homes affili-
ated with the League. The League represented most of the large 
nonpublic teaching hospitals and 11 large nonprofit nursing 
homes. Having beaten back a 47-day strike two years before, the 
League's key officials calculated that the union had little room to 
maneuver. They were dealing with a group of relative newcomers 
who were as unsure of their positions as the League's people were 
sure of theirs. This was a battle of unequal forces. The stronger 
won. The resulting contract was not even adequate. Hospital 
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workers in New York, whose increases throughout the 1970s were 
the local labor standard, were suddenly behind—behind even their 
public hospital counterparts. 
Within months of the '86 contract, the union was in yet another 
leadership crisis. Like the earlier one, the divisions appeared to 
many, both inside and outside the union, to be between a black 
woman president and male-dominated, mostly white, dissidents. 
The truth was far more complicated. The president was a black 
woman, Georgiana Johnson, but she was challenged by the 
majority of those who had run on her ticket in 1986. They were 
mostly the old union hands joined by the recently-elected, mostly 
black and Latino rank-and-filers who had become union officers 
for the first time. The fight was taken to the membership through 
a referendum on changes in the union's by-laws—changes which 
substantially strengthened the role of the executive council and 
diminished the powers of the president. 
Johnson lost. But the bitterness, the racial and class divisions 
within the union, were reaffirmed. Many of the members, most 
particularly nonprofessional black women hospital workers, saw 
Johnson's defeat as their defeat. As far as they were concerned, 
their union had been taken over by people with no interest in them 
or their problems. 
Resolving the Leadership Crisis 
The victors' problems were obvious. The union leadership had 
to find a way to gain legitimacy from its members and to restore 
those members' confidence in the union's ability to defend their 
interests on the job. In particular, it had to find ways to address 
the profound alienation of the two-thirds of the membership who 
were Hospital Division members. 
The solutions derived in large measure from a creative reappro-
priation of 1199's history. In the 1960s, as 1199 struggled to orga-
nize mostly minority health care workers, it explicitly tied their 
struggle to the larger civil rights movement. Dr. King and other 
civil rights leaders were frequent sources of inspiration and sup-
port for the union. That relationship was both a source of strength 
and a source of pride. 
The Tbrner administration had attempted to continue the tradi-
tion by courting black politicians and the black press. Her loss and 
the subsequent rupture between Georgiana Johnson and the rest 
of her slate reaffirmed the general consensus that the black com-
munity had lost an important black-controlled institution. To coun-
ter that consensus an alternative political strategy was devised. 
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It was a calculated attempt to show that the union was, despite 
its change in leadership, an important actor in the city's minority 
(both Latino and black) community. Its explicit intent was to 
activate the membership in union-sponsored political projects. 
The new political strategy built on the union's tradition, but with 
an essential difference. In the 1960s and 1970s, the union took 
progressive political positions, but it did not make membership 
participation a primary goal. The new campaigns, beginning with 
Jesse Jackson's primary race in New York in 1988, sought direct 
staff and membership involvement. 
The Jackson effort was far from a complete success. While staff 
were deployed throughout the city, giving 1199 a presence in local 
politics it had never before had, membership mobilization was 
incomplete. Some activist members joined the campaign, most did 
not. The result, however, was a source of pride for all. Despite 
the money and organization of the official Democratic Party, 1199 
helped Jesse Jackson carry the City of New York. 
Before the Jackson primary, the leadership had one big piece 
of unfinished business—an expired contract for 20,000 home care 
workers. Overwhelmingly minority women, many foreign born, 
home care workers were NYC's hidden health care system. For 
slightly more than minimum wage and virtually no benefits, they 
cared for thousands of disabled and elderly Medicaid recipients. 
While they were employed by community-based nonprofit 
agencies, these agencies were controlled by the city's Human 
Resources Administration. Reimbursement for services was set 
by city and state government. The public agencies were the real 
management. 
Most home care workers didn't know they belonged to a union. 
Since they worked in isolation from each other, they were 
extremely difficult to organize and even harder to mobilize. Those 
who were active in union affairs were, with few exceptions, sup-
porters of Doris Turner. The reason was obvious—Turner had 
organized them in the first place, and their gratitude was rein-
forced by ethnic and gender identification. The problem was com-
pounded by the 1986 leadership's ignorance of home care. No one 
on the insurgent slate came from the home care system. The new 
officers and almost all of the staff were recruited from among 
hospital workers. 
Given these problems, the challenge was to find a way to involve 
members and, at the same time, devise a strategy that would 
shame the politicians into acknowledging the legitimacy of the 
home care workers' demands. 
The Campaign for Justice for Home Care Workers had all the 
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Albany Rally, March 1989. 
elements which were later employed during the 1989 contract 
campaign—public hearings, rank-and-file lobbying, polling, coali-
tion building, rallies, organized press campaigns which tied the 
workers' issues to the community's need for services, and solicit-
ing the support of prominent leaders like Cardinal O'Connor, Rev. 
Jesse Jackson and Borough President David Dinkins. The most 
difficult activity was reaching and activating the members. Infor-
mal networks were identified and used, extensive direct mail com-
munication was employed, and, where workers had phones, phone 
banking was done. In all, as much as 15% of the home care 
workers were actively involved in the campaign. 
Despite all these efforts, after nine months of constant activity, 
in early March 1988 the city and state governments were stone-
walling, the campaign was stalled, and there was no resolution 
in sight. Three weeks later, however, an historic contract was won, 
providing wage and benefit increases of more than 50%. What 
had intervened was Jesse Jackson's showing in the primaries 
immediately preceding New York's. Governor Mario Cuomo capi-
tulated after news of the Jackson victory in Michigan, just two 
weeks before the New York primary. 
Dennis Rivera, then Executive Vice President of 1199 and a prin-
cipal mover in the home care workers' coalition, was directing 
the local efforts for the Jackson campaign. The New York City 
victory was widely celebrated in the black community and among 
1199 members. 
The home care contract and the union's high-profile participa-
tion in the Jackson campaign were the beginning of the end of 
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1199's racial polarization. The spring 1988 events had other 
positive consequences. Local 1199 was established as a force in 
New York politics. Elected officials in City Hall and Albany knew 
how the home care contract and the NYC Jackson primary had 
been won. The press also understood the union's role and there-
after frequently mentioned 1199 in articles about local politics or 
local labor issues. 
Still, the members' pride in these achievements wasn't enough 
to guarantee a decent contract in July 1989. 
Taking the Lead on Health Care Issues 
Planning for the contract began in earnest in the summer of 
1988. At two staff retreats, a coherent strategy began to emerge. 
It had three elements: to find a way to reinvigorate and involve 
the membership; to establish the union as a principal spokesperson 
on health care issues; and to parlay newly acquired political 
influence into getting the legislature and governor to commit 
sufficient resources to address the problems of an ailing health 
care system. 
The process began in early fall 1988. New York City is at the 
epicenter of the nation's health care crisis. Because of the rapid 
impoverishment of its population and the resulting epidemics of 
drugs, AIDS and homelessness, the city's health care system is 
near collapse. Who better to articulate the problems than front-
line workers? In September and October a series of speak-outs 
were organized across the city. Workers, together with represen-
tatives from community and religious groups, spelled out their 
problems before panels of local elected officials. 
At these sessions, workers talked about severe staff shortages, 
exhausting mandatory overtime, stressed-out colleagues and con-
sequent lapses in patient care. In some of the better attended 
speak-outs, upwards of 300 people came. The local media began 
publishing or broadcasting pieces on New York's health care crisis. 
1199 members were quoted in virtually every story and appeared 
on almost every broadcast. 
What had been implicit became explicit. The city's health system 
was collapsing and the problems of recruiting, training and 
retaining more workers was key to any eventual solution. In addi-
tion to pointing out the problems, the speak-outs allowed the union 
to take the moral high ground. In effect, the workers were saying 
our problems are your proolems. 
The speak-outs helped mobilize local political leaders and shape 
political opinion. This was key to eventually winning a decent con-
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tract. Health care is a privately run, publicly funded service. 
Through various regulatory bodies, upwards of 90% of hospital 
and nursing home income is controlled by state and, to a lesser 
extent, federal governments. 
Despite media attention on the health care crisis, the governor 
in his January 1989 budget proposed large cuts in the state's 
Medicaid reimbursement formulas. Organizing the fightback gave 
the union's leadership its first opportunity for large-scale member-
ship mobilization. The campaign was organized first through 
education of the staff, some of whom were trained in One-on-One 
communications techniques. Union-wide mailings were designed 
and phone banking set up. The union created a coalition of other 
health care unions and hospital associations for an Albany rally. 
In March 1989, 7,000 1199 members traveled to Albany to join 
4,000 other health care workers at a mass rally. To those who came, 
the experience was exhilarating. There had been no other rally 
like it in recent memory. The rally was followed up with a Mail-
gram campaign, where huge telegram-like posters were mounted 
in cafeterias, hospital lobbies and outside nursing homes, and 
members sought the signatures of everyone passing by. Within 
48 hours 250,000 signatures were obtained, trucked to Albany, and 
presented to various legislative leaders. 
In every respect the Medicaid mobilization was a success. The 
staff was able to organize the participation of thousands of mem-
bers. Alliances were made with like-minded union, industry and 
political leaders. The proposed cuts were completely stopped. 
It was a major victory for 1199, and was seen as such by the 
members. 
Like the speak-outs, the Medicaid mobilization was an impor-
tant step in restoring members' confidence in themselves and their 
union. They were engaged in an important and winning struggle 
without directly jeopardizing their jobs. Massed on the streets of 
Albany, workers got a feel for their power. From a few hundred 
at a time in the speak-out hearing rooms, the members now 
mobilized 7,000 strong. 
Mobilizing for the Contract Campaign 
Approaching the 1989 negotiations, 1199's key problem was the 
members' fear. With memories of the 1984 strike still very much 
alive, no one thought the strike threat could be used. And without 
that threat, how do you win a good contract? The answer was: 
it couldn't be done. The job, then, was to find ways to rebuild the 
members' confidence in themselves and their leaders. 
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In April, union-wide elections ended the internal battle for 
power. Dennis Rivera was elected president with 90% of the vote, 
and the ''union slate," nominated through an activist-staff caucus, 
was overwhelmingly elected, with no member of that slate taking 
less than 60% of the vote. 
Formal negotiations with the League of Voluntary Hospitals were 
scheduled to begin May 4, 1989. In preparation for these negotia-
tions, all through this spring period, the staff was conducting con-
tract surveys, setting up departmental meetings, holding Saturday 
and evening conferences, and organizing negotiating committee 
elections. The process, while very imperfect, got large numbers 
involved. For the thousands who filled out the surveys and parti-
cipated in the meetings, the contract campaign became very con-
crete; more important, they came to feel it was their campaign. 
But lurking not very far in the background was unease about 
the willingness of the members to act. A number of work-to-rule 
actions, some informational picketing, and some organized con-
frontations were done in some of the 46 institutions whose 
contracts were being negotiated. But the majority of workers did 
not participate in these activities. 
To overcome this passivity, the union recruited new leaders. 
1199's structure calls for elected delegates from each unit of each 
institution. Many of these people have had the job for y e a r s -
some since their place was first organized. To supplement, com-
plement and sometimes replace them, 4,000 additional activists 
were recruited to be contract captains. They were given special 
badges, sent special mailings, and telephoned regularly before 
every major event. They augmented the regular delegates at the 
assemblies and were provided with the same detailed reports as 
the delegates and negotiating committee members. 
In an industry dependent upon public money and regulation, 
the union was trying to use its political muscle to pressure manage-
ment. The union asked the League to join together in Albany for 
their common good. Management refused. The union, in turn, 
used its considerable leverage to discourage passage of manage-
ment-favored legislation. 
The opening rounds of negotiations were fruitless. Beyond the 
ritual dance, nothing happened. As the July 1 contract deadline 
approached, it appeared the process was dead. The leadership's 
assessment was that a full strike would either be rejected outright 
by the members' vote or violated by their actions. In its search 
for alternatives, the union's leadership came up with the idea of a 
one-day strike and mass demonstration. For the first time in its his-
tory, 1199 did not go out the minute its contract was up. Instead of 
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"no contract, no work," the rallying cry was "no contract, no 
peace.'' 
Dividing and Conquering 
Simultaneously, the union and representatives of the four hospi-
tals in the New York Catholic Archdiocese, who were not members 
of the League, decided to hold intensive, informal negotiations. With 
the help of the State Health Commissioner and the intervention 
of the Cardinal, a contract was agreed upon shortly before the 
scheduled one-day strike. 
The settlement, a generous one, was announced at an emergen-
cy delegate assembly convened just before the scheduled one-day 
strike. The Catholic settlement became the benchmark. It went a 
long way in helping members see what was possible if they were 
willing to fight. 
The assembly, attended by both delegates and contract captains, 
set the tone for future meetings. These meetings became more fre-
quent as the level of activity intensified. Reports, strategy discus-
sions and decisions were laid out to these rank-and-file leaders. Peo-
ple had an incredible sense of ownership and participation. The 
assembly became a pep rally. 
Still, the League refused to budge, claiming that its hospitals could 
not afford the settlement. To the members, who knew that the 
Catholic hospitals were among the poorest in the city, manage-
ment's arguments seemed incredible. 
The strike day was designed as a show of strength and solidarity. 
With buses picking people up from all over the city, members were 
asked to assemble in Central Park for a march to League head-
quarters. No one knew what the response would be. Even the most 
optimistic were stunned when 34,000 of the 50,000 affected 
members turned out. 
The press coverage was great. The members were as amazed by 
their turnout as the staff was. It was clear that, with the right 
message, a lot of work and creative leadership, 1199 members were 
willing to take some, if not all, necessary actions. Shortly after, a 
large public meeting of 1199 members and supporters was address-
ed by Jesse Jackson and mayoral candidate David Dinkins. Jackson 
promised to join the next strike. 
The League made no offer. Next came a number of briefings of 
political, religious and community leaders, hosted by the union. 
Out of these, came a growing sense that everyone supported the 
workers while the League had few allies. A full-page New York 
Times ad signed by over 120 elected officials made the relative posi-
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tions of the two parties very public. The union's support was grow-
ing and the League was, day by day, becoming more isolated. 
Despite the intransigence of the League, there were intervening 
victories. Some of the most vulnerable hospitals caved-in and signed 
agreements identical to the Catholic hospital settlements. These 
institutions were responding to the deepening resolve of the 
membership and to the intensifying political pressure. These sign-
ings were timed to coincide with demonstrations and assemblies. 
Each was greeted by thunderous applause and helped enormous-
ly to reinforce the members' resolve. 
Still, the League made no offer. A vote for a two-day strike was 
taken. The rate of participation in the vote and the proportion 
approving the action had increased dramatically. The target 
hospitals weren't selected until the night before, but the degree of 
organization was elaborate enough to get 25,000 people in place. 
Unbeknownst to management, which had made complicated 
skeleton staff arrangements, the second day of the strike was can-
celed at 4 pm of the first day. 
The next escalation was a three-day strike and series of events. 
Most successful was a rally in downtown Manhattan joined by hun-
dreds of striking telephone workers and addressed by repre-
sentatives of striking coal miners and Eastern Airlines strikers. 1199 
was turning its fight into a more general labor struggle. Least suc-
cessful of the planned events was the third day when people were 
supposed to go to their separate institutions and picket. After the 
excitement of the previous rallies, picketing was a real downer. 
Despite this, no one crossed the lines, and there was near perfect 
participation during the entire three-day strike. 
Again, the League put nothing on the table. At this point the 
leadership made a very risky decision. They suspended strike acti-
vities and made public their intention of putting the full resources 
of the union into the campaign it had been instrumental in 
starting—David Dinkins' mayoral primary fight with Mayor Ed 
Koch. The League was momentarily delighted. As one CEO was 
quoted as saying, "good, we'll kill two birds with one stone—1199 
and David Dinkins." They underestimated both the union and 
Dinkins, who won the Democratic primary in early September. 
Three weeks later, a very nervous 1199 staff conducted an 
authorization vote for a full-blown strike. Participation and approval 
was substantial. The strike was called for October 4. Still, no serious 
negotiations. 
The strike was planned for Wednesday at 5 am. On the previous 
Friday, the chairman of the Board of Trustees of Presbyterian 
Hospital (the largest voluntary hospital in New York and whose 
An Organizing Model of Unionism 79 
CEO was President of the League) approached the union seeking 
a settlement. In one day, an agreement very like the Catholic con-
tract was negotiated. Over the next four days, other significant 
League stalwarts settled. 
Finally at 3:30 in the morning, a demoralized League executive 
committee capitulated. In 1984 and 1986, the League had taken 
advantage of a deeply divided union. In 1989, the union turned 
the tables. It was able to exploit differences in the League. In 1984 
the League tried to break the union. In 1989 the union broke the 
League. 
1199 After the Contract Victory 
The contract campaign produced a contract far better than anyone 
could have anticipated. It clearly reestablished the union as an im-
portant force in the city's health care industry. Most importantly, 
it restored the members' pride in themselves and their institution. 
But it did not completely transform the union. Many of the 
weaknesses which led to such creative solutions during the cam-
paign still existed after the campaign was won. 
In 1986, the chapter structure of the union was nonfunctional. 
1199 President Dennis Rivera (center) announces the settlement at 
the Catholic hospitals, with John Cardinal O'Connor (right) and Basil 
Pater son, 1199 Chief Negotiator. 
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In the hospitals and nursing homes with the most active members, 
the chapter was an arena for continuing fights over the union's 
future. After the '89 contract victory, those internecine wars 
ended. But it did not leave vibrant, functioning chapters. The very 
tactics which helped mobilize for the contract struggle helped 
make the chapter operations irrelevant. Through phone-banking, 
mailings, newspaper ads and mass rallies, the contract campaign 
had deliberately bypassed these structures and appealed directly 
to the members. 
It has been impossible to figure out how to rebuild chapters 
whose primary mission is dealing with very local, day-to-day prob-
lems. Grievances are not as exciting as mass rallies. Nor do they, 
with rare exceptions, touch members' lives in the same way. 
Without effective chapters, the union has no good way to respond 
to members' problems, a situation which results in an erosion of 
members' confidence in the union and in themselves. 
Not only were the chapter structures ignored during the con-
tract campaign, but the staff's unique position was undermined. 
During this campaign, the leadership spoke directly to the mem-
bership and vice versa. Most of the staff had no special role. In 
the usual course of events, staff is the primary means for the union 
to communicate with and mobilize its members. The relative 
inexperience of the staff was one of the main reasons the alterna-
tive conduits were developed. But their very effectiveness, like 
the effectiveness of the campaign techniques, makes reconstitu-
tion of local structures very difficult. 
The delegate assemblies have developed into major forums for 
discussion between rank-and-file leaders and the elected officers. 
The union now functions best around broad issues— budget cuts, 
health care policy, the war in the Gulf, strike support. But it is 
not very effective in dealing with the kinds of problems people 
face every day at work. 
The very successful contract campaign left some very perplex-
ing dilemmas: How to make both types of organizations, political 
and labor, work. How to move the big struggles and win the small 
ones. How to build a competent staff and at the same time main-
tain an extremely active rank-and-file leadership. How to integrate 
the larger political struggles of people's lives with an organization 
dedicated to addressing workplace issues. 
In short, 1199's successful use of contract mobilization techni-
ques rapidly increased the union's clout in local politics and at 
the bargaining table. Nevertheless, its nervous dependence on 
campaign techniques has, to date, proven alien to the ordinary 
life of the union. • 
